[PART 1] Contemporary musical production and consumption have become increasingly pluralist, seemingly bearing out postmodernist accounts of the eroding distinction between 'high' and 'low' cultures. Accordingly, accounts of twentieth-century music ought to be able to narrate these different musical spheres -emblematized by the phenomena of Elvis and Darmstadt -together. While such gestures are not altogether absent from some recent histories of twentieth-century music, the results suggest that a more developed theorization of cultural pluralism is needed, one that also has a political dimension. Liberalism is one polity that espouses cultural pluralism and value pluralism, ideas that are not entirely separable from postmodernist relativism. Both epistemes are limited, however, by a disinclination towards dialectical thought and by the absence of ideology critique. [PART 2] Theoretical concepts from Slavoj Žižek (influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis, and Laclau and Mouffe's ideas of radical democracy) hold the potential for a post-Marxian model of ideology critique that might galvanize approaches to musical pluralism. Such an application could be relevant to various kinds of music, without giving a priori preference to one musical style over another -as was the case with Adorno. That said, these ideas have significant resonances with Adorno's negative dialectics, and are valuable in developing a form of strong relativism that could dialecticize a dialogical approach to musical pluralism. This suggests the possilbity of construing pluralism not as the achievement of stasis (or 'the end of history'), but as a means of effecting social and historical movement beyond the present cultural paradigm.
contemporary musical landscape gives evidence as good as any. On the production side we've seen a whole field of 'postvernacular' 3 exploration opening up: Elvis Costello teaming up with the Kronos String Quartet, Björk drawing inspiration from Stockhausen, (post-)dance electronica converging with (post-)minimalism, and one-time pop singer Scott Walker moving into 'serious' music (his 2006 album The Drift, is powerfully serious). On the consumption side, it's not just that our CD collections might include Maxwell Davies alongside Miles Davis, The Doors, and Dunstable (they probably always did, with or without modernist alphabetizing tendencies); it's that we can now flaunt it. No guilt need attach to any nook or cranny of our musical preferences, since these days all music is in one way or another valid; just name your criteria. Arts and broadcasting tell a similar story, in the UK at least: witness the 'Meltdown' festivals on London's South Bank; or the eclectic, bordercrossing, boundary-blurring playlists of BBC Radio 3's Late Junction and Resonance fm's Where's the Skill in That? (formerly Radio 3's Mixing It); or the inclusivist polygeneric programming and educational policies of The Sage Gateshead in the north-east of England.
These trends have their counterparts in musicology. We see it in the pluralist policies of journals such as this and the UK's Biennial International Conference on Twentieth-Century Music, whose titles no longer connote (as they might once have done) only avant-garde or high modernist repertories. 4 We see it too in the canon-busting and autonomy-critiquing missions of the critical-and new-musicological movements, the latter (partly by dint of its own self-referentiality) a predominantly US phenomenon that has often been explicit in coupling historiographic revisionism with a postmodernist outlook. Exemplary in this respect is Susan McClary's upbeat farewell to the idea of music history as a unilinear mainstream:
Postmodernism -with its rejection of entrenched master narratives -demands of us a far more diversified way of telling the history of music [. . .] : a history that includes medieval liturgists, Renaissance courtiers, Austrian symphonists, Canadian country/western singers, and rappers from Long Island, a history of perpetual bricolage and fusions of hand-me-down codes and conventions -a history in which Western musicians have always been reveling in the rubble. 5 In this the concluding paragraph of her book Conventional Wisdom she refers back to, among other things, the analysis in her final chapter of pieces by Philip Glass, John Zorn, k.d. laing, (the artist formerly known as) The Artist Formerly Known as Prince, and Chuck D of Public Enemy. The sheer diversity of the line-up is part of McClary's point, but so too are the connections she draws between these figures: their 'flaunting of signs and convention lifted from earlier styles', their 'active negotiation with the cultural past [. . .] [which] includes only as one of its tributaries the classical-music tradition'. 6 Such an approach commands attention not only for the new and different insights it offers, but also for the values it enshrines: the author represents herself as an investigating subject who is open-minded, decent, humane.
But . . . . This of course is the structural 'but' that has been waiting in the wings from the start. Having now reached that moment of antithesis, however, I want nonetheless to hold on to the humaneness of McClary's account (for at the end I shall be urging for agonism not antagonism). So, I should be clear that in what follows I don't seek to refute the presence of, or what's positive about, the pluralist consciousness that seems definitive of our present conjuncture. Indeed, I would endorse Richard Middleton's emphasis on the importance of this 'new historical phase in which it is becoming clear that only when others are freed to pursue their own trajectories can Western music properly acknowledge the multiplicity of differences lying beneath its authoritarian binaries and become productively other to itself '. 7 But everything depends on the kinds of construction we put on this new situation, and I'm far from certain that we've really begun adequately Added to all this, I would query the assumption of many pro-postmodernists that 'the incomplete project of modernity' (to use Jürgen Habermas's phrase) has no voice left in these debates. True, the undeniable postmodernity of our culture has foreclosed some of the possibilities of that project, and trying to see it through to completion purely on its own terms is no longer an option (and probably never was). However, this is not to say that modernism's unanswered questions -about alienation, about the possibilities for the autonomous subject in a world increasingly marked by domination and reification -can just be passed over as belonging to an outdated paradigm. If anything they have become more urgent in our new century. The point, I would surmise, is neither for modernists and postmodernists to slug it out over whose epistemology is superior, nor to look for some positive synthesis of these two related but nonetheless different paradigms, but rather to consider whether some historical movement in our thinking might plausibly issue from working up the tension between them. So if my approach in the following exploration of musical and cultural pluralism looks more neurotic than that of, say, McClary, I hope this will be read as emerging from interests no less ethical. I shall leave the details of this approach to unfold below, but had better issue a few riders beforehand.
First, the forms taken by contemporary cultural pluralism reflect an increasingly globalized world (not least in the vibrant panoply of 'world musics'), and, compared with earlier (modern) binarisms of 'cultivated' versus 'vernacular' culture (or mass culture versus modernism), aggregate a much more complex array of differences and otherness. That said, the operation of a distinction, however reified, between popular and high culture cannot yet be assumed to have been dissolved, and given certain postmodern narratives to the contrary, it seems even more important to maintain critical awareness of this. If in the following account this latter issue is the more explicit and receives (on this occasion) greater priority, this is not to say that my arguments are not also made in some measure with the more global postmodern situation in mind.
Secondly, I somewhat shamelessly use the historical phenomena of Elvis and Darmstadt iconically -as representatives of a certain moment in popular and high modernist culture. This risks a degree of essentialism, as well as the disappointment of fans of either (or both!), who may have been hoping for new insights into these topics. The subtitle's the thing: this essay is more about the relationship (or perceived non-relationship) between phenomena and cultures that we have not, for much of their history, been encouraged to think of or experience together, but which from our contemporary perspective might now be considered in the same frame; the question is how, and with what kind of cultural and political values? Having said all this, I won't entirely leave Elvis and Darmstadt as ciphers; they do provide moments of particularity through which to test out more necessarily generalized ideas as they evolve.
Thirdly, many of the arguments in this essay pertain as much to cultural pluralism in general as they do to musical pluralism in particular. Indeed, the discussion often operates in the former register. But if music itself periodically takes a back seat, it's still in the same vehicle, and this is partly my point: that concerns around music operate not merely homologously with, but on the same continuum as, other cultural and political concerns.
Fourthly, this essay is both more and less than an account of musical pluralism. Less, in that (owing to limitations of space, regrettably) it neglects an anthropic dimension to the problem -the idea of music having diverse functions relating to a diversity of human and cultural needs (related to the idea, currently a burgeoning area of sociological research, of 'music in everyday life'). 8 More, in that the question of pluralism spills over into still bigger, ultimately existential ones: how are we to live, to act, to be, in our contemporary world? If I were to attempt a thumbnail summary of what follows, I would describe it partly as a struggle to articulate the terms of an authentic postmodern self -an oxymoronic notion, of course, and that's just what's at stake. This would be a self that is responsive to and engaged with the plural (multicultural, global) conditions in which it now finds itself; but also one whose 'authenticity' would lie precisely in the retention and/or development of a second, dissident (perhaps still-modernist) self that is not content to become identical to a lifeworld increasingly dominated by the commodity form. In short, this would be a plural self twice over: the first time in its responsiveness to the cultural and representational diversity of the postmodern world; the second time in its simultaneous articulation of non-identity with the first. This multiple determination of the self reflects, I would argue, the movement of our social and 8 See, for example, Allan Moore's discussion of popular and classical styles in relation to ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl's categories of musical functions; Moore, Rock, the Primary Text, . See also DeNora, Music in Everyday Life. I discuss the 'everyday life' approach to musical consumption, as well globalization as a context for musical pluralism, in my forthcoming article, 'Beyond the Global Imaginary: Decoding BBC Radio 3's Late Junction'.
cultural history: we are caught between less-than-compatible moments and modalities of being, as if in the rift between historical tectonic plates. And this is reflected, I would argue, in the tension between our different constructions of the history of cultural phenomena such as music. In our present postmodern moment the juxtaposition and interplay of musical styles and genres has become eminently thinkable, indeed in some quarters has become the norm. Through this lens, then, we might look back at an earlier, more distinctively modernist musical moment -say the 1950s -and interrogate its more rigid cultural separation of styles, and the hegemonies involved in the historical narratives that have reinforced these distinctions. However, this is not to say that we can simply embark on a revisionist historiography based on dissolving them. If anything, that moment might equally speak back to us, and challenge us about the meaning of our own pluralism; perhaps even suggest that there's also something important in distinctness. I would argue that we need first to experience and then to work through the friction between these different paradigms. To echo a conceit of Slavoj Ž ižek (in turn echoing one by Groucho Marx): modernist paranoia or postmodernist schizophrenia? Yes, please! 9 Finally, all this points to a level of complexity and non-containability that makes its mark on the form of this essay -essentially a tension between parts and whole. One corollary is that the two main parts are to some extent continuations of one another, to some extent complementary, to some extent autonomous; and the same goes for individual sections. This is probably as it should be. Regarding content, this could, on the one hand, be understood most pragmatically as offering a range of resources (concepts, vocabularies) for mapping our present-day pluralist terrain; readers will undoubtedly differ in what they might select or prioritize from these, and in how they might negotiate their conjunction with their own schemata -this understanding is part of the pluralist (or dialogic) spirit of the enterprise. On the other hand, while I decline to judge any single epistemology from those examined below as unequivocally correct or incorrect, I do not present them neutrally or assign them equal validity.
I
To begin, an anecdote. The Music department in which I currently teach is notable for an agenda of musical pluralism and inclusivity, which, though roughly contemporaneous with the Blairite agenda of widening educational participation, has, we hope, a different ideological motivation, that is, one other than meeting the instrumentalist demands of the employment market. In the first year in which we embarked upon this project in earnest we introduced a new degree programme in popular and contemporary music, and it was integral to our philosophy that its students would share classes with those on other programmes, including those more orientated towards classical music. Suddenly, then, the class taking my course 'Music in Contemporary Culture' had not only a larger but also a much more diversified constituency. The curriculum still included its traditional brush with post-war musical modernism, partly to foster a historicized understanding of what it is that postmodernism is 'post'. Among its snapshots were the usual canonic suspects at their avant-garde extremes: Messiaen, Boulez, Cage, Ligeti, and other Darmstadt boys. So what happens when you add to the class a cohort of students whose background and programme of study are rooted in popular music? Well, for me it forced a kind of mental dialogics in which the history you're telling suddenly collides with an image of the different history you might -and arguably should also -have been telling under these altered demographics. It brings into vivid focus the fact that Stockhausen's Zeitmasse and Nono's Il canto sospeso are exactly contemporaneous with Elvis Presley's 'Heartbreak Hotel' and Chuck Berry's 'Roll over Beethoven ' (all 1956 ). This imagining of musics normally kept in their safely separate historical containers, now rearticulated in a potentially volatile chain of meaning, was what I term my I'm still possessed by two, possibly three, judgements on this realization. The first is one of levity. Of course, such musics were contemporaneous; didn't you know it all along? What's the problem? Relax; be amused; be happy that we have such an entertainingly diverse array of musics to enjoy. The second judgement is one of gravity: of something profoundly shocking; of a diremption in our culture that ought to forestall any uncritical application of terms such as 'our culture' (singular), or any assumptions of unity when we casually use vocabulary such as 'twentieth-century music' or indeed 'modernity'. The third judgement concerns the possibly intimate connection between the first two. This becomes clearer if we push the moment of levity to its ludicrous -or at least ludic -extreme: what I might call the Elvis-and-Darmstadt party game. See how many versions of the Elvis-and-Darmstadt paradigm you can dream up. If you take the terms not literally, but as iconic of historically synchronous but aesthetically incongruous moments in twentieth-century music, then you can engage in the trivial pursuit of such arguably meaningless coincidences as the fact that the period 1946-52 in which Michael Tippett composed his first opera, The Midsummer Marriage, was exactly contemporaneous with the recording career of Country singer Hank Williams. The apparent absurdity of such synchronous connections is perhaps what encourages us to regard the split between popular and high culture as if it were the natural state of things -in other words to reify it. And with this realization, which points to something troubling, we move towards the gravity of the second judgement. Already, then, one can begin to sense a political dimension at work behind these two registers whose counterparts in the lifeworld might be the pleasures of consumerism and the rigours of ideology critique. If the Elvis-and-Darmstadt realization seems like the answer to an unasked question, perhaps the question is one about repressed knowledge that stops the question from being asked.
10 Elvis is, of course, a recurrent cultural apparition (in an idiolect appropriate to Part 2 of this essay, a spectre, we might say), and it is possible that at the back of my mind at this moment was Lawrence Kramer's incorporation of Elvis into an equally heterogeneous line-up in the final chapter -'Epilogue à 4: Autonomy, Elvis, Cinders, Fingering Bach' -of his Classical Music and Postmodern Knowledge (1995) '. 12 Now in one sense the standpoint of these authors is unimpeachable: operating within a time-honoured scholarly practice, their histories are implicitly or explicitly of specific genres of music in the twentieth century, not the totality of the century's music. For who would be equal to the latter historiographic task? But the point about an unavoidable division of labour reveals what the commonsensical objection to the larger project conceals: a radical fracturing of cultural and social existence. Hence Griffiths's judgement on his Elvis-and-Princeton juxtaposition passes over the possibility of its being of major culturalhistorical consequence -not devoid of, but absolutely pregnant with, meaning. This, then, begs the question of whether it may be possible to write a different kind of history, in which, as it were, Elvis and Darmstadt could be thought together. Let's not assume there are no precedents for doing so. McClary's writings constitute one example of a pluralist historical consciousness; there are also others. Richard Taruskin's The Oxford History of Western Music might just qualify: its coverage of the later twentieth century includes a chapter on popular music in the 1960s; and while this raises the obvious charge of tokenism, a charitable critic would note that in a project whose main business is the Western art-music tradition this gesture at least opens a window on to another musical world and provides a whiff of acknowledgement of musical others (nevertheless still represented as such). 13 Less scholastic, but carving a more original historiographic paradigm, is John 11 A comment of Richard Middleton's -that a book's index could be read as its unconscious -further persuades me that examining indexes can be a non-trivial activity. 12 Griffiths, Modern Music and After, 150 . In fairness, Griffiths makes this statement in the context of a slightly wider discussion that looks forward to the next decade, the 1960s, as one in which musical crossovers begin to happen. That said, Griffiths's text is hardly awash with references to popular music; his basic strategy is to concentrate hermetically on art music. 13 Taruskin rehearses a well-established trope of twentieth-century music historiography, which draws in music from 'outside' the high art canon either as a supplement, or only when this is informative of it. See also, for example, Salzman, Twentieth-Century Music; Morgan, Twentieth-Century Music.
Rockwell's All American Music, which narrates a history of twentieth-century music in the USA through a series of composer studies crossing a range of genres: practitioners of art music -modernist and postmodernist -get considered on an equal footing alongside jazz and popular artists, the reach extending from Babbitt through Talking Heads via Sondheim. Rockwell's non-othering attitude and advocacy of musical catholicism imply, paradoxically, that he's responding to a norm of musical consumption that is the very opposite. 14 But that problematic leaves no real dialectical marks on a text whose tenor is one of epicureanism, celebrating a 'happy babble of overlapping dialogues'. 15 One could imagine a more radicalized, internationalized version of Rockwell's approach that would in effect be a series of micro-histories focusing on particular localities and more circumscribed historical conjunctures. This might be a more 'writerly' text, leaving the reader to author any possible connections or meanings from the juxtapositions; but it might also represent a form of nominalism that sent a message of no generalizable meanings from the array of particulars. A more empirical version of this approach might attempt to offer its own threads of narrative connectivity -a kind of that's-all-from-Darmstadt-meanwhile-over-in-Memphis . . . history. The recent Cambridge History of Twentieth-Century Music (which at one point does indeed migrate from Woodstock back to Darmstadt between neighbouring chapters) lies somewhere between these extremes. 16 In their Introduction the editors point both to subterranean connections and continuities throughout the volume, and to the diversity (and implicitly the incompatibility) of the historiographic and ideological models, and even of conceptions of music itself, contained within it -the inevitable corollary of an inevitable division of intellectual labour. Whatever the merits or defects of individual chapters, this bricolage issues from the editors' aspirations to construct some politically viable framework for a contemporary occidental music history: one with tangible and self-knowing elements of relativization, but one whose empirical usefulness to its market readership is not undermined in the process -almost certainly a contradictory brief. For all its imperfections, the work represents an attempt unprecedented in scope at a multi-perspectival historiography of the period -a fact that might have mitigated the hostility of reviewers pronouncing from the security of an essentially monological standpoint. 17 Paradoxically, the figure whose critical corpus most bears the internal scars of a sustained and uncompromising dialectical consideration of both popular and high culture is Theodor W. Adorno. His enormous critical-theoretical project was not, of course, primarily 14 See Rockwell, All American Music, 5-6. He nonetheless also recognizes a growing group of musicians, music-lovers, and academics for whom the seemingly radical presuppositions that underlie this book are already taken for granted, at least subconsciously (12). He also acknowledges two other important studies that equinanimously treat American music as 'a dialogue between the ''cultivated'' and the ''vernacular'' ' (3) historicist, but it was in an important sense historicizing, 18 in that it saw the conditions of contemporary culture as profoundly historically determined -as a dialectical working through of the conditions of the Enlightenment; and in that it saw itself as a historical intervention in those conditions. (It is this latter understanding of history that henceforward informs the present account.) On the one hand, Adorno's views will be seen by many as epitomizing -in Georgina Born's words -'a defining discursive and aesthetic characteristic of the dominant high modernist tradition', namely 'its assertion, under the guise of a self-referential, formal autonomy, of its absolute difference from popular musics'. 19 And this syndrome itself could be seen as the consummation of a historical tendency within Western modernity of a tacit dependency of high culture on its disavowed 'low-Other' in both its financial and imaginary economies. 20 On the other hand, for all that Adorno's largely disparaging comments on popular music have drawn opprobrium, it's hard to think of anyone who has so consistently and probingly considered the relationship of the two spheres in conjunction with a developed social, aesthetic, and political critique. 31 The radical element shared by both would be: scepticism towards Enlightenment values. Berlin is again paradigmatic of the liberal standpoint: while as liberal rationalist he professes himself deeply sympathetic to much of Enlightenment philosophical and political thought, he also recognizes in it the roots of political authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Hence his attraction to counterEnlightenment philosophers such as Johann Georg Hamann, Giambattista Vico, and Johann Gottfried Herder. 32 Herder in particular represents an historical touchstone both for liberal traditions of cultural pluralism and for postmodernist relativism, whose maxim would be, in Berlin's paraphrase, 'that one must not judge one culture by the criteria of another; that differing civilisations are different growths, pursue different goals, embody different ways of living, are dominated by different attitudes to life'. 33 The correlative of this viewwhich pinpoints another confluence between liberals such as Berlin and exponents of postmodernism -is an incredulity towards the Enlightenment's metanarrative of a universalist ideal of Reason as the telos of history.
We could hypothesize that postmodernists and liberals would part company around the distinction between relativism and pluralism, a nuance which Berlin introduced into his later accounts of Vico and Herder (for example, in his essay 'Alleged Relativism in EighteenthCentury European Thought'), 34 and which is potentially relevant to our attitudes towards musical difference. On Berlin's view, the distinction is homologous with that between subjectivity and objectivity. To take relativism first, he characterizes this most bluntly with the platitude 'I prefer coffee, you prefer champagne. We have different tastes. There is no more to be said.' 35 Elsewhere he develops this into a more acute description that in effect construes relativism as a construction of difference so extreme as to preclude any '. 40 Given that humanism, here linked to pluralism, is a key ideological target of postmodernists, this would seem to reinforce the point that postmodernism and liberalism are distinguished by their espousal of relativism and pluralism respectively (at least as Berlin defines these terms). However, a rigid homology between the oppositions pluralism/relativism and liberalism/postmodernism is difficult to maintain. For one thing, for a self-declared musicological postmodernist such as McClary, the very assumption of a common human horizon and the possibility of communication between different kinds of culture (that is, the conditions that Berlin and others see as essential to liberal pluralism) is what enables her, in her Conventional Wisdom, to traffic gracefully between different musical genres and periods. It is what renders her account humane. Does this mean that McClary, possibly along with other writers in the new musicological canon, is a liberal in postmodernist clothing? Or could it be that postmodernists and liberals do indeed share a wardrobe? 41 Berlin's distinction between relativism and pluralism is, arguably, itself unstable. Some blurring arises as a result of the way he understands the 'objectivity' of the ends and values of a culture, which may in (pluralist) principle be incompatible with those of a different culture. A key reference point is again Herder, whom Berlin describes as believing 'in objective standards of judgement that are derived from understanding the life and purposes of individual societies, and are themselves objective historical structures'. 42 'objective standards of judgement' are inferred from individual societies in their historical particularity makes it unlikely, then, that Berlin intends 'objectivity' as synonymous with the universalizing standards of Enlightenment reason. He would seem to mean a kind of non-positivist objectivity -an objectivity relative to particular, historically and culturally determined structures.
IV
Relativism thus remains at the crux of debates around cultural (and hence musical) pluralism. But even if a rigid distinction between the two terms is difficult to uphold, this does not mean we should see relativism itself as a unitary phenomenon. Just as present-day Consciousness Studies has proposed (though not necessarily agreed on) the distinction between an 'easy' and a 'hard' problem of consciousness, so too we might consider the usefulness of both an easy and a hard formulation of the problem of relativism, which we could call, respectively, weak relativism and strong relativism. My intention is not to make this distinction strictly cognate with other related pairings proposed above or below. Part of the point is to create a different, somewhat more open-ended, conceptual scheme that does not especially seek to be coterminous with any of the others, and that thus offers a standpoint from which to evaluate them.
Of course, the easy formulation (as in Consciousness Studies) is only relatively easy; and weak relativism is not necessarily a pejorative label. True, it would seem to be epitomized by the 'soft' liberal-pluralist arts policies of much public service broadcasting in the UK, for example BBC Radio 4's arts review programme Front Row, or Melvyn Bragg's ITV arts documentary series The South Bank Show, which is proud to take popular music singer Tom Jones as seriously as Beethoven. 43 Such productions are liberal in the sense that they 'embrace diversity as an intrinsic value' (which may be read either as a possible riposte to or as further fuel for Boulez's anti-liberal jibe that 'everything is good, nothing is bad; there aren't any values, but everyone is happy'). 44 Conversely, weak relativism can be considered in its more radical aspect, 45 as in Lyotard's foregrounding of the incompatibility of discursive worlds, or in the rigorous refusal of some anthropologists (and ethnomusicologists, their musical counterparts) to judge (the music of) any given culture by the terms of one's own, and certainly not to peddle judgements about intrinsic cultural superiority or inferiority.
Weak relativism must ostensibly limit its theoretical foundations, since as soon as it begins to argue them it sets up de facto an episteme which it must privilege above others, and therefore cease to be relative in its own essence. Hence it is characterized either by postmodernist scepticism towards grand narratives or by liberal pragmatism. 46 perhaps postmodernists too -the weak-relativist attitude is characterized by tolerance, or a kind of managed non-antagonism. This is not to be disparaged: it is the minimum requirement for any form of multiculturalism, whether this be between, for example, racial groups, or exponents of different genres of music in the same educational establishment. However, weak relativism has at least one obvious limitation. While at its most generous it exemplifies good will, it makes no requirement beyond indifference to the other (the liberal principle of negative liberty: we are each free do our own thing in our own space, provided we don't create conflict or challenge the liberal principle of doing one's own thing in one's own space). Strong relativism inhabits discursive territory whose existence can be theoretically predicted, initially at least, in negative terms. It is defined as being neither universalism nor weak relativism. Seeking to avoid the pitfalls or limitations of both, it represents a criterion that is a desideratum for any viable -I am inclined to say, authentic -approach to cultural plurality. Exactly how this position might be positively determined remains moot, and it is probably salutary to resist giving it definitional closure. However, we could start with this observation: if weak relativism ideally assumes good will towards the other, perhaps it also relies on the cultural convention of good manners -a tacit understanding not to probe the other too critically about the premises of their cultural practices and discourses (or indeed oneself about one's own). What if we were to drop this? We would then move away from the, so to speak, plural monologism of weak relativism, which recognizes the existence of other cultures but has no compunction about indifference towards them, to a more genuinely dialogical culture of the kind theorized by Mikhail Bakhtin, in which the different voices of a heteroglot society are acknowledged as answerable to one another, and as permeated by one another.
The tenor of this dialogue would therefore be critical. Mutually so; which is where the hard aspect of the hard formulation comes in. For the cultures concerned are unlikely hitherto to have enjoyed equal empowerment; historically the relationships between them may well have been hegemonic -in Western musicological discourse: art music prevailing over popular music, 'Western' music over 'non-Western', and so on. To move beyond hegemony would require self-reflexivity on all sides: a mutual desire to avoid a continuation not only of domination but also of victimhood -dynamics not unlike those of decolonization.
V
The call for respect for alternative canons can be made on the basis of a purely liberal respect for other literatures and experiences, but that will not necessarily comprise a challenge to the dominant order to the very extent that alternative canons are seen simply as coexisting peacefully in a pluralistic academy. [. . .] To believe [. . .] that there can be no responsible way in which I can adjudicate between your space -cultural and historical -and mine [. . .] is to assert that all spaces are equivalent: that they have equal value, that since the lowest common principle of evaluation is all that I can invoke, I cannot -and consequently need not -think about how your space impinges on mine, or how my history is defined together with yours. If that is the case, I may have started by declaring a pious political wish, but I end by denying that I need to take you seriously. 47 Writing from the standpoint of postcolonial literary theory, Satya P. Mohanty here voices concerns that have many resonances in the present essay, among them the relationship between the academy and a wider politics, and the problematics of a cultural relativism that is the contemporary condition of both. His writings contain a number of ideas that can be valuably woven into this inquiry, with due regard to both their possibilities and their limitations. His critique is aimed at what I have termed 'weak' relativism and the way it precludes the necessity for, or even (in its radicalized forms) the possibility of, evaluation between cultures. A concern for this last, that is, intercultural judgement, could be argued as a further hallmark of strong relativism, although Mohanty uses the term 'antirelativist' to describe his own stance. While his words show a desire to distance himself from liberalism (or at least certain versions of it), his approach to multiculturalism develops ideas whose historical lineage is in no small way connected with it (or at least certain other versions of it). This can be seen in the way his antirelativism chimes with that of liberal philosopher Charles Taylor (of whom, more shortly), especially the latter's analysis of the incommensurability of cultures, which in turn harks back to Berlin's use of the term. Moreover, Mohanty's antirelativism shares with Berlin's cultural pluralism the call to articulate some minimum common human criterion that makes cultures intelligible to one another and judgement between them possible: How do we negotiate between my history and yours? How would it be possible for us to recover our commonality, not the ambiguous imperialist-humanist myth of our shared human attributes, which are supposed to distinguish us all from animals, but, more significantly, the imbrication of our various pasts and presents, the ineluctable relationships of shared and contested meanings, values, material resources? It is necessary to assert our dense particularities, our lived and imagined differences; but could we afford to leave untheorized the question of how our differences are intertwined and, indeed, hierarchically organized? 48 Mohanty's Herderian aspiration to 'recover our commonality' also resonates with the polemics of Kofi Agawu's essay 'Contesting Difference: a Critique of Africanist Ethnomusicology'. Agawu takes possibly the more radical line. For example, while Mohanty's claim that 'if ''we'' decide that ''they'' are so different from us [. . .] we may [. . .] ignore the possibility that they will ever have anything to teach us' betrays an instrumentalist attitude to diversity, 49 Agawu argues that fixating on what is different in other cultures leads to worse sins than missed cross-cultural opportunities: 'by constructing phenomena, objects, or people as 47 Mohanty, 'Us and Them', 14 (emphasis original ''different'', one stakes a claim to power over them'; to foreground difference, he suggests, is a reifying, colonialist tendency, one presented as a self-evident interpretative position, but in fact a choice, made 'within a broader economy of representational practices and impulses'. 50 Whatever their differences, both Mohanty and Agawu seek strategies for rethinkingdeconstructing even -the relationship between self and other. And a significant reference point for both is Taylor's essay Multiculturalism and the 'Politics of Recognition' (though again their critical lines diverge). Mohanty approvingly quotes Taylor's assertion that while we might in principle work on 'the presumption [. . .] For a sufficiently different culture, the very understanding of what it is to be of worth will be strange and unfamiliar to us. To approach, say, a raga with the presumptions of value implicit in the well-tempered clavier would be forever to miss the point. What has to happen is what Gadamer has called a 'fusion of horizons'. We learn to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken for granted as the background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the different background of the formerly unfamiliar culture. The 'fusion of horizons' operates through our developing new vocabularies of comparison, by means of which we can articulate these contrasts. 52 But this Gadameresque approach, Agawu argues, is conducted from a 'third space', which 'is ultimately an extension of the West's; it is our ''vocabularies of comparison'' that will be enriched'. 53 (In passing, we should note the topographical trope inherent in many accounts of cultural pluralism: Mohanty's talk of adjudicating between 'your space [. . .] and mine'; Gadamer's horizons, which define the boundaries of such spaces; Agawu's 'third space '. 54 Nor is this the last time we will encounter or deploy the spatial metaphor.)
In his response to this further example of an instrumentalist attitude to difference, Agawu's initial tactic is to invert Taylor's hierarchy. He writes: 'we should be able to bring the ''presumptions of value'' implicit in a raga to bear upon an investigation of the WellTempered Clavier, thus allowing flow in both directions. [. . .] It ought to be possible for others to ''other'' us if they so desire.' This might indeed lead to a fruitful kind of dialogism, but in fact Agawu posits a yet different tack for the critique of difference, which is to 50 'eliminate it altogether and substitute a carefully defined sameness'. He speculates on how 'an embrace of sameness might also prompt a fresh critique of essentialism'; how it might explain how the same individual subject 'can be equally moved by a hymn, a traditional dance, a local proverb, a quotation from Shakespeare, a piece of reggae, the Wedding March, and the latest Highlife music'. Although he is speaking here of 'the peculiar juxtapositions of cultural practices that define modern Africa', it would be entirely in the spirit of his advocacy of sameness not to be oblivious to similarly 'peculiar juxtapositions of cultural practices' that are a characteristic of the putatively postmodern West. 55 Could it be that in our consideration of the juxtaposition of Elvis and Darmstadt we have too readily responded to the all too obvious differences between these various forms of twentieth-century music? Might these appear this way only because of a reified instinct to see difference as the natural state of things? What if we were instead to 'attend to sameness'; to seek to 'recover our commonality'?
VI
There would be no value in challenging our reifying reflex towards difference if the quest for sameness didn't involve a juxtaposition that was jarring -if the particulars weren't, in Taylor's words, 'sufficiently different'. From the outset, then, this spells out that difference and sameness are entirely codependent, dialectically bonded. And intertwined with this is another pair of terms in the comparative equation that likewise won't shake free of one another: contingency and determinateness. All these conditions become clear when we proceed to a concrete example. If we're looking for two musical utterances sufficiently different to make points of commonality truly significant, the conjunction of Elvis's rendering of 'Mystery Train' (recorded 1955 Rain (1954) ? In principle, all comparisons are equally possible and potentially (though differently) revealing. However, the point is that in each case the choice, once taken, appears retrospectively determinate under a third (possibly unacknowledged) sign -whether it be the idea of the composing subject; or a particular (wider or narrower) geographic (indeed geopolitical) framework; or a more or less rigid determination of what constitutes a synchronous historical moment; or a particular set of creative and aesthetic values. The quasi-contingent juxtaposition of 'Mystery Train' and Le Marteau, then, suggests a synchronic cut (at the year 1955) across a narrative plane whose coordinates appear to determine -but were perhaps determined all along by -a certain conception of emergent post-war modernity, a geographic reach beyond a single continent (but confined to one hemisphere and to a certain notion of 'the West'), and an ideological investment in the idea of iconic figures and canonical pieces. At first, the temptation to foreground difference is hard to resist. Should we not pay attention to the fact that one piece exists as a work, possessing a kind of virtual existence underwritten by its notated score, while the other, a popular song, has its being in the act of performance? Well, we might; but would it not be more insightful to regard both pieces as existing in performance ontologically underwritten by recording technology? This would do more than argue for recording as a supplement to live performance (and point out that historically both pieces have been available both ways). It would be to claim that in both cases the reception of live performance would (or could) have been pre-mediated by knowledge of the pieces in their recorded versions, just as both the production and consumption of studio recordings may be accompanied by a virtual image of live listeners in the mind of the performer, or live performers in the mind of the listener, at the moment of making or listening to the recording respectively. Already, then, this suggests that recording technology may be one term through which an Elvis-and-Darmstadt history could be conducted. For this is a medium, arising at this particular historical conjuncture, that afforded new conditions of musical production and cultural dissemination. And this leads to the next conjuncture: where the issue over which version represents the original and which the copy becomes yet more complex; where studio versions of popular music albums become difficult if not impossible to 'reproduce' in live performance.
We could perform a similar inversion on another seemingly self-evident difference between Elvis's performance of 'Mystery Train' and Le Marteau: the way that the rhythmic groove of the former seems to energize the body in a way that the pointillist musical gestures of the latter apparently don't. Emphasizing difference here might render us prey to making a simplistic equation between a Cartesian mind/body dualism and that of 'serious' and popular music. To be sure, in the case of Le Marteau, we don't feel the thrusts of Elvis's pelvis or the gyrations of his legs; but we still register the unpredictable musical gestures bodily, maybe less publicly, maybe subcutaneously, maybe in different parts of the body, and maybe precisely as different -dislocated -body parts; but bodily no less. So both types of music, we could venture, represent important interventions in the cultural history of bodily representation. Elvis's notoriously libidinal performances engendered in a post-war younger generation a corresponding sense of liberation, part of the process of articulating the new and unique identity of the post-war teenager; while modernist music problematizes and alienates our everyday bodily sensibility, thereby also challenging our habitual somatic relation to ourselves and the spaces around us. Nor would it be gratuitous to remind ourselves of the sensuousness of Boulez's sound worlds; of the fact that his music as much as Elvis's summons up an erotics.
Other aspects of comparison, however, leave one to wonder whether difference doesn't remain in the ascendant. Not least is the matter of the socio-historical delineations of the two pieces: on the one hand, a song and a singer that brought together different strains of music -blues, country, pop -in a hybrid inviting identification from both black and white working-class audiences of the American South; on the other hand, a work connoting, albeit critically, a tradition of European art music, purged of hybrid tendencies, whose appreciation depends on previously accrued cultural capital belonging historically to bourgeois (and implicitly white) listeners. We also get different relations of production around the different musical materials: on the one hand, the orally based 'head-arrangement', worked on in the studio but with the aim of sounding spontaneous; on the other hand, a rationalizing, imperious compositional control in which every element of the notated score is determined by post-serial processes. But it may also be that there are still important commonalities to be found, not in the immediate sound worlds, but in the cultural work that they do. Agawu makes a relevant point:
The idea would be to unearth the impulses that motivate acts of performance, and to seek to interpret them in terms of broader, perhaps even generic, cultural impulses. Such a project would ultimately look beyond the immediate material level [. . .] by emphasizing the contingency of [musicians'] material and conceptual investments. Objects function as a means to an end, and it is the complex of actions elicited by such objects that betrays the translatable impulses behind performance. Focusing on such impulses promotes a cross-cultural vision without denying the accidental specifics of local [. . .] practices. 56 Again, this is territory similar to that explored by Mohanty. Seeking to push beyond the work of 'sophisticated relativists' such as anthropologist Peter Winch, Mohanty searches for some minimum criterion of rationality that might be common behind the diverse, competing rationalities of different cultures. He seeks what he calls a 'further specification of the ''human'' ' that doesn't lapse into essentializing notions of a unitary and self-sufficient human subject. One such possible specification, he argues, is 'the conception of agency as a basic capacity shared by all humans across cultures'. 57 Moreover, what further determines this agency as specifically human is its colouration by second-order reflection; it is 'not merely the capacity to act purposefully but also to evaluate actions and purposes in terms of larger ideas we might hold about, say, our political and moral world, or our sense of beauty and form'. Such a 'capacity for self-aware historical agency' 58 is certainly commonly evidenced in these examples from Elvis's and Boulez's outputs. On both sides we see -and hear -a common desire to act upon culture, to change it, through interventions as practitioners and as socially constituted subjects. When, in Jeremy Marre's TV documentary on Elvis, Peter Guralnick speaks of 'the newness, the strangeness, the uniqueness, the jumping-off point that [Elvis's] music represents', 59 it would seem perverse to regard these qualities as utterly different from those we hear in the music of contemporary high modernists. Moreover, we might discern in both rock 'n' roll and the avant garde at this historical moment that particular species of agency termed resistance. This notion circulates in discourses of legitimation of both musical types: for example in Dick Bradley's casting of rock 'n' roll as an agent in what he terms 'rituals of resistance'; and in Friedrich Hommel's citation of Thomas Mann's observation that the 'courageous initiative' of Darmstadt was proof that musical 56 Agawu, 'Contesting Difference', 235 (emphasis added resistance had never been extinguished in Germany. 60 Of course, this possibly common form of 'self-aware historical agency' between two such different phenomena is spotlighted from a third space that is far from neutral; it is one concerned to promote the case for a progressive modernism, a perspective not necessarily shared by other cultures of popular music and its study. That said, the position at least makes its interests known, and, compared with Adorno's privileging of modernist art-music as the only kind capable of embodying aesthetic resistance, this would be a notably more inclusive stance.
But, as ever, we need to hold this possibility in mind with its critical other, the voice that would remind us that these agents for cultural resistance or change might tend in very different directions. To update our example, we might discern a similar impetus to resistance in the music of, say, Public Enemy and Harrison Birtwistle -the former, exponents of hardcore hip hop; the latter a figure with almost iconic status in the British press as a 'difficult' composer (a status which, however unnuanced, is probably a not unwelcome marketing ploy to promoters of his music, and resembles the truth). On the one hand, whatever the differences between these artists, we can discern in the music of both a desire to make abrasive interventions, to voice disenchantment with the order of things, and hence (whether explicitly, in the case of PE, or implicitly, in the case of Birtwistle) to urge for change. Yet, on the other hand, whatever their similarities, these musics address very different social constituencies, distinguished, very roughly speaking, by race and/or class; 61 constituencies whose imaginings of social transformation (and of ways of achieving it) may imply very different dynamics of difference, and possibly incompatible outcomes. Assuming that these musics and musics like them offer their audiences (at least in principle) more than goods for culinary consumption; assuming they also offer the possibility for constructing cultural identities better equipped to perform critical cognition of their social beingassuming all this, then together they may tend in the direction of antagonism as much as they may signal the potential for solidarity.
VII
That sameness and difference presuppose one another, that they decline to cede to one another and instead partake in a restless, irresolvable tension, represents perhaps nothing less than an epistemological and political absolute of our present historical conjuncture. It is expressed dialogically in the epigraph to Part 1 of this essay -words from Public Enemy's song 'Fight the Power'. It can also be construed dialectically (a point addressed in Part 2, below). And there are other possible constructions of it, each driven by its associated political standpoint. It is embodied, for example, in the notion of incommensurablity -as employed by Berlin, and taken up in the liberal philosophy of Taylor and post-liberal theory of Mohanty. As Taylor puts it, incommensurable cultures 'are different, yet they somehow occupy the same space ' . 62 Mohanty appears to construe this mutually occupied space as the shaded area of a Venn diagram, a construction we can infer (since he doesn't explicitly put it this way himself) from his summary desideratum of a multiculturalism based on 'the difficult but necessary job of specifying commonalities and articulating disagreements and of learning from one another'. 63 The implied shaded zone represents both a starting point for mutual understanding, and the place from which cultures may interrogate (and potentially disagree with) one another's values -the latter a crucial aspect of Mohanty's antirelativist project. It is worth re-emphasizing here that such engagement need not be confined to cultures that are geographically remote; neighbours too might perceive themselves as occupying significantly different cultural-epistemic locations, articulated, say, by radically different musical preferences and their associated worldviews. 64 How shall we work through our disagreements? Mohanty is clear: if we're not to retreat back into our relative corners, these will need to be negotiated through a form of rationality. However, the terms of reference would belong not to some transcendental 'third space' outside the Venn diagram, surreptitiously annexed by one of the parties (Agawu's criticism of the fusion-of-horizons model), but instead to the shaded area within it. This can represent a genuinely shared epistemic territory, Mohanty would claim, because there is a form of rationality that underpins all human endeavour, namely 'the capacity that all human ''persons'' and ''cultures'' possess to understand their actions and evaluate them in terms of their (social and historical) significance for them'. 65 This would not be, then, the grand narrative of Western Enlightenment Reason, but rather a 'postpositivist ''realism'' ', which 'proposes that theoretical accounts of objectivity depend on explanatory accounts of error and distortion. Both kinds of accounts base understanding -as well as its limits -in social practice.' 66 This looks uncannily like the 'objective standards of judgement' that Berlin invokes in his account of cultural pluralism; and indeed their common source is Herder: Mohanty declares that his project of a cultural pluralism, based on a postpositivist construction of realism and objectivity, 'is an attempt to rewrite Herder's vision of cultural diversity in the form of a cogent and modern social theory '. 67 There are two points here that Mohanty fights shy from making explicit, but which would seem far from detrimental to his case. First, is an 'objectivity [. . .] in effect be a form of strong relativism, supplanting the weak relativism he is rightly keen to refute)? Secondly, is not the ability to discern 'error' and 'distortion' in the discourse of another not roughly homologous (or synonymous) with 'ideology critique'?
Taylor himself meanwhile is simultaneously more radical in his account of incommensurability and less malleable in his stance towards the other (presumably throwing down the gauntlet to 'soft' relativists). His intentions are certainly honourable: 'really overcoming ethnocentricity', he argues, 'is being able to understand two incommensurable classifications'. 68 But the very fact that incommensurable outlooks 'somehow [. . .] occupy the same space' implies that the relationship is going to be combative: 'incommensurable activities are rivals [. . .] . Only where two activities are simply different is there no question of judging one to be an inferior version of the other.' 69 There is no question of a 'shared space' here, then; no overlapping area of the Venn diagram: instead we have 'incommensurable interlocutors' staking competing claims over the same space. 70 Nor is this agon conducted with reference to 'some common criterion by which one is proved inferior to the other', since in one sense this is exactly what the struggle is about. Hence: 'one set of practices can pose a challenge for an incommensurable interlocutor, not indeed in the language of this interlocutor, but in terms which the interlocutor cannot ignore'. So even if modern scientific rationality is the contender over its Renaissance predecessor, it is judged superior not (just) because it represents a better instantiation of rationality per se, but rather because of an illocutionary force that would seem to exceed this, whereby 'the interlocutor is forced to recognize that something has been achieved' because of 'the connection between scientific advance and technological pay-off ', which 'at least creates a presumption against him'. 71 The trope of force permeates this section of Taylor's account (reminding us of his assertion elsewhere that 'Liberalism is [. . .] a fighting creed'). 72 In effect he would seem to be underlining the performativity of an episteme, beyond its constative content, as its deciding criterion -'once a spectacular degree of technological control is achieved, it commands attention and demands explanation'. And the fig leaf really falls off a few paragraphs later, when, with no apparent irony, we're reminded 'of the ditty about nineteenth-century British colonial forces in Africa: ''Whatever happens We have got The Gatling Gun, And they have not'' '. 73 Taylor -nearly -rescues the mounting ethnocentric drift of his discussion with the important caveat that there is no such thing as a single argument proving global superiority. The dissociation of understanding of nature and attunement to the world has been very good for the former. Arguably it has been disastrous for the latter goal. For all that this extends a democratic willingness to take those others seriously, and for all that the point about transculturalism is well made, it also constructs a worrying division of epistemic labour, one that renders the plurality of worldviews as a non-interactive array of monologisms. To leave responsibility for 'attunement to the world' to other cultures is to fail to absorb the full contradictory tension (some might say the tragedy) of the modern predicament. What's missing in this liberal account, then, is any notable impulse to turn its ambivalence towards Enlightenment values into a dialectic. It shows itself loath to internalize the negative force of the utterances of its others in such a way as to set into historical motion what it posits. Thus, even at this more robust end of the spectrum of liberal (and post-liberal) approaches to cultural pluralism, we find crucial components missing from models that might otherwise help us respond productively to the plurality of the musical sphere. For all its humanity, then, liberalism has significant limits.
PART 2: IDEOLOGY, ANTAGONISM, AND RADICAL DEMOCRACY
Herein lies one of the tasks of the 'postmodern' critique of ideology: to designate the elements within an existing social order which [. . .] point towards the system's antagonistic character and thus 'estrange' us from the self-evidence of its established identity. 75
VIII
What strong-liberal approaches to the plurality of contemporary culture have to commend them is their insistence on judgement -their recognition that we do no favours to others by being merely indifferent to their cultural discourses and practices (as in more laissez-faire brands of liberal pluralism). But, as we have seen, liberalism offers problematic answers to the question of transcultural judgement, specifically on the question of what -and whosecriteria are the appropriate ones. The issues are similar to our everyday practices of musical judgement: within genres this is fine in principle, even if individual judgements are in practice contestable (and are perhaps all the better for this); but we get nervous about judging between genres (betraying the operation of the weak-relativist paradigm). So while we might argue over which were Elvis's best songs (or over the relative merits of the earlier or later Elvis), even to attempt to debate whether 'Mystery Train' is a better piece than Le Marteau (or, more generally, which of Elvis or Boulez was the greater creative figure) either seems faintly ridiculous or risks the charge of Adorno-style cultural elitism (from one side) or vulgar popularism (from the other). But perhaps there is an arena of transcultural judgement which -leastways at our present historical moment -pertains equally to all musical spheres and does not a priori privilege any one over the others. This would be the domain of ideology, in which all types of musical utterances might in some way be implicated, and against which they might in principle have different means and potentials for critique and resistance. This critical concept is, of course, no less fraught than any other, both definitionally and from the standpoint of a postmodern discursive world that would refute the possibility of any undistorted, or foundational, or objectively identifiable ground of 'truth' from which putatively ideological utterances may be judged as such. I shall turn to this matter presently. For now I want to assert that it is those very postmodern cultural conditions that make the critique of ideology once more an urgent matter. For these are conditions in which commoditization, and its work of fantasmatic concealment, has successfully extended its reach into virtually all forms of cultural production and consumption. This situation -the consciousness of which lies at the crux of Frederic Jameson's critique of postmodernism (and also my own) -is a key element in contemporary cultural pluralism (not least in the idea that cultural products may be in some way equivalent or exchangeable), and an omnipresent symptom of late capitalism. Which is why Jameson writes that 'every position on postmodernism in culture -whether apologia or stigmatization -is also at one and the same time, and necessarily, an implicitly or explicitly political stance on the nature of multinational capitalism today'. 76 And it is the failure of both liberalism and postmodernism to be adequately disturbed by this cultural dominant (to use Jameson's terminology) 77 that renders them insufficient as political theories for engaging critically with this condition. This lacuna is related to that noted in Part 1: liberalism's disinclination towards dialectics, a tendency that prevents liberalism from registering the full antinomic tension of what is simultaneously productive and oppressive about postmodernity. It is these lacunae that demonstrate the necessity of the body of thought that postmodernism and liberalism disdain (this aversion being another corner of their common ground): Marxist (or post-Marxist) critical theory. Among those we could turn to in this critical corpus is Jameson himself; and it will be clear from what follows that I also consider Adorno a figure who will remain relevant for at least as long as we are under capitalism's domination. On this occasion, however, I choose to focus principally on ideas from Slavoj Ž ižek, not least because of his particularly suggestive thinking about ideology, developed from the psychoanalytical theories of Jacques Lacan, as well as from the work of Louis Althusser, likewise influenced by Lacan and also a point of reference in Ž ižek's theories. I draw principally on Ž ižek's accounts in his essay 'The Spectre of Ideology' and in What They Do. However, my account focuses on the former work, not least because of its (relative) clarity; and much of sections IX-XI below maps the trajectory of its third chapter, 'Che Vuoi?' on to our particular cultural and musical concerns here. The following exploration to some extent also follows a parallel track to Richard Middleton's essay 'The Real Thing? The Specter of Authenticity'. This quasi-convergence is probably in equal parts a matter of influence, synchronicity, and shared concerns; and I'm not sure I could now disentangle which aspects of my account Taking our cue from Ž ižek, we may surmise that the way forward for ideology critique is not to be based simply on some 'objective' attempt (postpositivist or otherwise) to distinguish truthfulness from falsity. As we have seen, Taylor's antirelativism is itself a principled quest for whose worldview is most truthful, yet it founders on the metaphorical violence of its monological desire to silence the voice of the other. In Ž ižek's words, 'we are within ideological space proper the moment this content -''true'' or ''false'' (if true, so much the better for the ideological effect) -is functional with regard to some relation of social domination (''power'', ''exploitation'') in an inherently non-transparent way '. 79 But what, then, is a suitable model for a critique of ideology? If, in a postmodern world, truth is acknowledged only as relative to its social, cultural, and historical context, from what transcendental perspective could we investigate ideology? For me to assert your position as ideological and mine as ideologically untainted is immediately to fall prey to ideology. But Ž ižek argues that it is equally ideological to claim all positions as equally ideological: 'to renounce the very notion of extra-ideological reality [. . .] -such a quick, slick ''postmodern'' solution [. . .] is ideology par excellence'. He nevertheless believes that it is possible 'to assume a place that enables us to maintain a distance from [ideology] , but [that] this place from which one can denounce ideology must remain empty, it cannot be occupied by any positively determined reality'. 80 To grasp what Ž ižek is getting at with this notion of an 'empty place' (a radically different construction of the ideologically tainted 'third space' identified by Agawu as underpinning Taylor's musings on multiculturalism) we need to go back a step and look at the Lacanian features that inform his model.
Lacan is potentially helpful in reading ideology because his theories unmask how our (illusory) sense of selfhood is entirely bound up with the operation of language -and, we might say (glossing over the problematics of such an analogy), of other signifying systems such as music. On the Lacanian view, a characteristically ideological perception would be that 'we' use such symbolic systems to represent 'reality'. While it may seem that way, Lacan would argue the reverse: that it is the symbolic order that constitutes both 'us' and the world we perceive through it; hence we are subject to (or subjects of) the vicissitudes of its processes and its potential to reproduce its own (culturally predetermined) order in us. This is what is parlous to models for cross-cultural dialogue such as Mohanty's postpositivist realism, however attractive this episteme is in many other ways; the positive content of the 'reality' that is the basis for negotiating between cultural positions is always already coloured because the symbolic order that constructs it is prior to and other to -indeed, in Lacanian parlance, the big Other of -the subjects who deploy it, and in fact are deployed by it. 81 reflect which aspects of the dynamics of our conversations. In our different ways we both work through Ž ižek's account of Lacan's 'graph of desire', and while our approaches and conclusions are certainly not identical, I hope that some meaningful connectivity between them may be discerned. 79 Ž ižek, 'The Spectre of Ideology', 8. 80 Ž ižek, 'The Spectre of Ideology', 17 (emphases original). 81 Consider, for example, Mohanty's valuable assertion (quoted earlier) that a common criterion of all human cultures is 'the capacity [. . .] to evaluate actions and purposes in terms of larger ideas we might hold about, say, our political and moral world, or our sense of beauty and form' ('Us and Them ', 22) . The point is nonetheless that those different constructions of the moral, political, and aesthetic world may well be determined by interests of power opaque to
But it would seem that we are not completely in thrall to the big Other. In contrast to the positive content of 'reality', Lacan posits the Real -a negatively defined, empty, 'impossible' space -as a place outside the symbolic order. While the symbolic order, the domain of the signifier, renders the world to us as a meaningful environment by articulating reality into differentiated units of meaning, it is unable to capture it as a totality; it leaves a remnant of the Real. That which eludes symbolization is therefore characterized as both unsymbolized void and suppressed remainder; and this is the zone from which, Ž ižek claims, the critique of ideology is possible. I would interpret his claim in this way. Although defined negatively, as an absence, the Real is nonetheless an actual existent, a kind of zero that is essential to the operation of the entire equation of meaning. That we can posit something outside the symbolic order makes it possible for you to know that my construction of reality, necessarily articulated through the symbolic order, can't possibly be all that there is, and hence to have some position from which to identify the ideological cracks in it. Now, on one level, giving the Real its due may be no more than a tiny theoretical nicety: the additional, formal recognition of an element that operates in conjunction with the faculty through which we always critiqued ideology anyway: the cognitive decryption of the rhetorical ploys of language and thought. 82 And this would therefore make only a marginal, formal difference from Mohanty's postpositivist objectivity, whose basis would also seem to be one of intersubjective cognition. But in fact Ž ižek's reasoning here shows a much closer (and arguably less than fully acknowledged) affinity with Adorno in his Negative Dialectics, as suggested by the following from the latter:
The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concept without leaving a remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy. Contradiction [. . .] indicates the untruth of identity, the fact that the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived. [. . .] It is a thesis secretly implied by Kant -and mobilized against him by Hegel -that the transconceptual 'in itself ' is void, being wholly indefinite. Aware that the conceptual totality is mere appearance, I have no way but to break immanently [. . .] through the appearance of total identity. 83 Although Ž ižek inclines towards a Hegelian rather than Kantian conception of 'the void', 84 there seems a trenchant connection between his emphasis on the role of the negatively determined Real beyond the symbolic order, and Adorno's mobilization of what is nonidentical to conceptual thought as a means of breaking out of reifying bounds of the concept. Moreover, the dialectically facilitating role of contradiction in the latter's theories is not their own exponents and subjects, precisely because these are perceived as 'real' or 'objective' in the postpositivist sense that Mohanty argues for. 82 Matthew Sharpe offers a partial critique of the Lacanian dimension of Ž ižek's ideology critique on similar grounds, stating: 'the notion of the ''non-existence'' of the big Other that Zizek imports from Lacanian psychoanalysis to political theory is at once ontologically too profound, and politically too bloodless, to do the work that we require of it. Older conceptions of ideology need also to be retained' (Sharpe, 'The Sociopolitical Limits of Fantasy', par. 39). 83 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 5. 84 See Ž ižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, dissimilar to that played by antagonism in Ž ižek's (and in both this plays out much more productively than the cognate concept of incommensurability in Taylor's arguments).
Ž ižek follows Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in his understanding of antagonism, and, like them, relates this to the Lacanian void of the Real. The nub of the matter is Laclau and Mouffe's thesis that 'society does not exist' 85 -meant in a spirit exactly opposite to that of Margaret Thatcher's deeply ideological assertion that 'there is no such thing as society'. On their view it is impossible to represent society as a totality, precisely because of the antagonisms (around class, identity, etc.) that constitute it. To seek representational mastery of the totality would therefore be ideological. In this regard Ž ižek recounts Lévi-Strauss's analysis of representations of an aboriginal South American village by its inhabitants, in which two of its subgroups gave two entirely different (Taylor might have said 'incommensurable') pictures. Ž ižek follows Lévi-Strauss in stressing that this is not a case of relativism (in my terminology, weak relativism). The truth of the matter is precisely the antagonism revealed by the incommensurable perspectives. It would not be revealed in any objectively 'correct' picture such as an aerial photograph -from this 'we obtain an undistorted view of reality, yet we completely miss the [R]eal of social antagonism, the non-symbolizable traumatic kernel that found expression in the very distortions of reality'. 86 No major contortions are necessary to translate this into musical terms. There was Elvis (or Chuck Berry, or Little Richard, or Johnny Cash, or . . .) and there was Boulez (or Babbitt, or Cage, or Berio, or . . .); and the issue is not that they offered differing perspectives on what progressive music was in the 1950s (though they surely did that), nor that one group's output had a prima facie case for the greater legitimacy, truth content, authenticity (or whatever term might stand in for veracity: there is a modest bump here in translating from epistemic claims to aesthetic ones); it is rather that these radically different musics together reveal an image of society 'prevented [. . .] from stabilizing itself into a harmonious whole'. 87 But there are yet further ways in which considering these musics together both benefits and benefits from an account of ideology.
IX
What is it that differentiates musical spheres (pop, classical, folk, etc.) and their associated cultural meanings and values? Taking a Ž ižekian-Lacanian line, we might argue that each determines a different ideological articulation of the signifier 'music' (an argument that also assumes that the discursive fields 'around' these spheres are as integral to their construction as their properly musical materials). As the standard (post-)structuralist wisdom has it, signifiers are defined not by any positive content, but by their differential relationship to a network of other signifiers around them: 'music' can be defined by its difference from any number of cognate signifiers -'sound', 'noise', 'language', 'dancing', etc. In effect Ž ižek's analysis of ideology assumes two theoretical moments in the relational state of these signifiers. In the first moment these arrays of 'proto-ideological' signifiers are manifold and fluid; they are 'non bound'. Then, in a second moment, they are totalized into an ideological field through the action of a nodal point -or point de capiton in Lacan's parlance -which halts the free floating of signifiers and 'quilts' them into a 'structured network of meaning'. To adapt an illustration of Ž ižek's, a signifier such as 'musician' could in its 'proto-ideological' moment refer to many types of musician -one can be a popular musician, a classical musician, etc. But, at the second moment, 'what is at stake in the ideological struggle is which of the ''nodal points'' [. . .] will totalize, include in its series of equivalences, these freefloating elements'. 88 The BBC's 'Young Musician of the Year' competition exemplifies one such totalization: here 'musician' actually signifies 'classical musician', to the exclusion, therefore, of many other kinds of musical practitioner. Conversely, when hip-hop star Eminem (a somewhat different kind of musician) raps 'Music is like magic, | There's a certain feeling you get | When you're real', 89 the signifier 'music' activates a different totalization, or 'quilt', of signifying connections, with different prescriptions, proscriptions, and exclusions (and different criteria for how to be 'real').
How then should we read the work of ideology in the compound signifier 'twentiethcentury music', and in this, the eponymous journal? On the face of it, the inclusivist policy of twentieth-century music ethically seeks to deconstruct previous ideological uses of the term that implicitly or explicitly restricted it to the connotation art music: it would seem to want to return the signifier 'music' to its pre-or proto-ideological floating state. But a Ž ižekian standpoint might argue that such a move would itself be ideological -an attempt to disguise the antagonism between the different constructions of the term. If nothing is excluded, if the term is not deployed differentially, is it not just meaningless? Worse, might this not even be mimetic of the doxa of late capitalist culture that nothing is thinkable outside its own order; that post-Fordism is the only way of doing things? Perhaps it is precisely because of this dominating 'reality' (and its associated claims of 'the end of history') that we still need recourse to some 'Real' of antagonism outside it (and thus to re-engender a sense of historical movement towards something less oppressive). This, then, is not to argue for a return to some notion of a unilinear musical mainstream (as rightly criticized by McClary), but to suggest that the picture rendered by an inclusivist policy should not be read as a pluralism comfortably resolved into a harmonious whole. There is no single authentic map of the village. 'Twentieth-century music' (and, by extension, 'twenty-first-century music') does not exist. ideology ('there is no practice except by and in an ideology'), but also that we could not become subjects but for such ideological determinations: 'all ideology has the function (which defines it) of ''constituting'' concrete individuals as subjects '. 90 For Althusser, what turns us from individuals into subjects is our being 'hailed' or interpellated by the voice of ideology. This idea serves as a starting point for Lacan's own theories of subjectivity: there is no 'subjecthood' without language; our becoming subjects and our adoption of/by the symbolic order are coterminous. Or, more precisely, what seemed prior -our subjectivity -is in fact a rectroactive effect of our responding to the hail, the interpellation, of the big Other. And just as ideology 'quilts' the free-floating signifiers into particular determinations, so we are 'sewn' into the symbolic order as we respond to those determinations.
These ideas have some bearing on the way we construe the formation of our identities. On the face of it, the others with which we identify (for a musician this might be, say, a pop idol, or even a certain idea of what a composer or performer is) constitute what we would like to see in our own reflected image -if not literally in the mirror, then in the eyes of other people. In Lacanian terms, this narcissistic relation (whose structure we acquired in the mirror stage of our psychological development) belongs to the order of the imaginary. 91 However, this imaginary identification (the image of what we would like to be), is, according to Lacan, dominated by another kind of identification -symbolic identification. As Ž ižek puts it: 'apropos of every ''playing a role'', the question to ask is: for whom is the subject enacting this role?' 92 In other words, who are we trying to please -or, in Althusserian terms, whose interpellation are we responding to -when we identify with the image of, say, a pop star, a great scientist, a university professor? This may well not be ourselves, but some authorizing or legitimizing agent representing the big Other or symbolic order, whose master signifier is the Name-of-the-Father. 93 In contrast to imaginary identification, which constitutes our ideal ego, symbolic identification constitutes our ego-ideal (and in the Lacanian allegory it is epitomized by the question 'che vuoi?' -'what do you want of me' -addressed to the imperious desire of big Other). In musical terms, it is perhaps in the classical sphere that the demand of the big Other is most directly tangible. In classical practices, whatever freedoms the ideal ego might aspire to are achieved as part of a bargain in which it subjects itself to (and hence subjectivates itself in) a disciplined commitment to the symbolic order, whether it be through the training of the performing body to its instrument, or the composing mind to a technical and theoretical (often notation-based) regime (harmony and counterpoint, the conventions of scoring and orchestration, and so on). Moreover, the institutions in which such training takes place (universities and conservatoires) themselves embody the authority of this big Other, just as those of us who teach in them have to run the gauntlet of being its representatives. Aesthetic modernism has had a traditionally ambivalent relationship with the big Other. On the one hand, its engagement with history is defined by its dissidence against the way things are, against the symbolic order in its historically constituted form. On the other hand, that dissidence has in many cases involved not a complete undercutting of the symbolic order but a rewriting of it, with the attendant hazard of itself moving into the space of the big Other. Schoenberg provides a classic example. Recall his famous anecdote about the occasion when, serving in the army, he was asked by a superior officer whether he was the 'notorious Arnold Schoenberg'; and his reply -'nobody wanted to be, someone had to be, so I let it be me'. 94 Responding to the desire of the big Other, Arnold Schoenberg the individual was interpellated into Arnold Schoenberg the composing subject of the New Music. (On a Lacanian reading, what this anecdote also illustrates is the contingent nature of the process. Had another set of circumstances prevailed, Schoenberg would not have been at that place in the signifying network at that time, would not have been 'this notorious Arnold Schoenberg'. That he appeared always already to have been the Arnold Schoenberg in question is a retroactive construction made possible only once he had acquiesced to the interpellation.) As is well enough known, Schoenberg's own stylistic development involved not dispensing with the musical symbolic order, but establishing a new articulation of it, most paradigmatically under the master signifier of serialism. Continuing in post-Freudian mode, we might claim that, through the authority which he exerted over his pupils and which was vested in him as his ideas were culturally disseminated (notably, through the academy), he himself came to represent the Name-of-theFather. Likewise, the oedipal struggle of successive generations for custodianship of the role served only to reinforce rather than undermine it, of which there is no more obvious example than Boulez, with his infamous article 'Schoenberg is Dead', his positioning for dominance at Darmstadt, and his subsequent establishing of his own institution, IRCAM, over which to preside as an iconic father of an iconic form of modernism. No wonder, then, that numerous critics of a postmodern persuasion (and others too) have targeted such figures in their attacks on modernism; and no wonder that a number of the most thought-provoking critiques have come from women, and/or have occupied a standpoint informed by gender studies and other critiques of patriarchy.
Yet what should not be overlooked is the fact that even those modernists who have invested most significantly in the symbolic order have also, by definition, found a point of resistance to the big Other's interpellation. Lacan '. 97 This 'gap opened up at the centre of the dialectic of the subject and the Other' is the territory of what Lacan terms the objet petit a; it emanates from 'the central lack in which the subject experiences himself as desire '. 98 This object-cause of desire exceeds the subject as constructed through the symbolic order, and is therefore 'in the subject more than the subject'. But at the same time, by being other to the symbolic order, it is 'a pure void' and thus 'a point of the [R]eal'. 99 This, then, is the same (Real) territory as the unsymbolizable totality that is the antagonism of society.
Let us recall that this Real is also the very space from which, Ž ižek argues, the subject is potentially able to voice a critique of ideology. Hence the Real, apprehended in the subject as the objet petit a, becomes a point of convergence of what is traumatic both to the individual subject and to society, and through this convergence becomes a point from which the former might gain insight into the truth of the latter. It thus becomes relatively unproblematic to connect this point about the function of a traumatic void between the subject and the symbolic order to well-rehearsed (largely Adornian) arguments about the composing subject's problematized relation to his/her aesthetic materials (elements of the symbolic order) under modernism: the collapsing of the differential function of consonance and dissonance, the disruptions of form and musical continuity -in short, what the earlier Adorno described as the 'rupture between self and forms'. 100 And there is a further resonance between Ž ižek's identification of the negative space of the Real as a site of ideology critique and the later Adorno' Music, 23) , this suggests the composer as an already formed subject finding a shortfall in objective expressive resources; on a Lacanian reading, the issue is to do with the very problematic of the subject's formation, the objet petit a being generated out of this trauma as an object within the subject that nevertheless exceeds it. 101 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 131. 102 For a slightly revisionist account of this episode see Gibson, 'Elvis on the Ed Sullivan Show'.
interpretation. Take the moment where Elvis found his voice, so to speak, in those early Sun Records recording sessions of 1953. Could it be that he and Sam Phillips excited in one another the objet petit a: some object-cause of desire, an apprehension of the not-yet-existing in the contemporaneously sounding web of musical signifiers, which Phillips managed to coax Elvis into symbolizing? In the later Lacanian scheme, the objet petit a is coterminous with a surplus meaning and a surplus enjoyment -in French plus de jouir. 103 This jouissance is an unsymbolizable, on some level disturbing, enjoyment beyond the pleasure principle (and because it lies beyond the symbolic order this enjoyment may be literally unspeakable, that is, obscene). The libidinal excesses of Elvis's performances, whose enjoyment involved a liberating lack of respect for the Name-of-the-Father, would most probably qualify on this count. But what's also suggestive is that the subjective experiences signified by these terms need not be seen as the exclusive property of any single musical sphere. The objet petit a and its associated register of jouissance could be seen as historically mobilizing forces common to both popular music and high modernism.
Nor need this commonality reduce the different spheres into a single one with no outside, since each could be seen as displaying a different symptom of these forces in their historical subjects -or, more precisely, sinthome: a penetration of the symbolic order by jouissance; 'a signifying formation beyond analysis, a kernel of enjoyment immune to the efficacy of the symbolic'. 104 At the risk of being reductive (but also in the interests of avoiding the opposite problem: declining to make necessary differentiations), could we perhaps posit that in popular musical forms, which have traditionally been orally based, these symptoms of jouissance are more likely to be found in acts of performance (witness Elvis); whereas in high-modernism, with its much stronger basis in notation and the institutions of the big Other, the symptoms are more likely to involve throwing spanners in the works of the symbolic order? If so, it's nonetheless also possible to discern some mediation of these differences (something that certain postmodern critics of modernism overlook in the interests of limiting the signification of 'modernism' to a certain kind of Darmstadt composer). 105 We could conjecture that graphic scores such as Bussotti's Siciliano, per dodici voci maschili 106 represent a kind of visual-performative jouissance, contorting the symbolic order of musicnotational practices into an Elvis-like dance on the page, creating impossible objects of the order of the Real.
The position we're now moving towards has the potential to use these Lacanian notions to show popular music and high modernism as both implicated in the same landscape of subjectivity, signification, and desire, but -importantly -as manifesting a different distribution of intensities across its topography. 107 modernist culture, while both having an oedipal relationship with the big Other (both need it, both need to resist it), play out the dynamics of that relationship in different ways? And if it were the case that aesthetic modernism must ultimately risk an ostensibly closer alignment with the big Other than popular culture (the latter, at least prior to its entry into the academy, having a less integral institutional relationship with the symbolic order), might we then hazard (perhaps more in a spirit of speculation than constative truth) that popular culture (or, perhaps better, the popular consumption of culture) involves a commensurably stronger investment in fantasy? In the Lacanian narrative, 'fantasy conceals the fact that the Other, the symbolic order, is structured around some traumatic impossibility, around something which cannot be symbolized -i.e. the real of jouissance: through fantasy, jouissance is domesticated, ''gentrified'' '. 108 Fantasy is thus a kind of coping mechanism against the unbearable pressure of the big Other. Perhaps, then, this is also a means whereby what is threatening in cultural forms is tamed, made palatable for mass consumption. (And maybe there is a historicizing dimension here: could it be the case that, to paraphrase Marx's comment on Hegel and history, significant ideas in culture appear more than once, the first time as jouissance, and thereafter as fantasy?) Elvis clad in black leather at his 1968 television comeback, subsequently in his jewel-studded jumpsuits (as favoured by many an Elvis impersonator -what better example of imaginary identification?); the intensification of these fantasies in the phallocentricity of cock rock and the campery of glam rock; the concept album and the pop video; the club scene; cyberspace: these phenomena all invite strong fantasmatic investment; and, as fantasy (which, Lacan tells us, is the enabling mechanism for desire) they establish the perfect form for the fetishism of commodities, which is in turn the means whereby the big Other of the music industry, of high capitalism, disguises its interpellation and our symbolic identification with (or by) it. One of the virtues of Ž ižek's account is to have located ideology as operating on both the level of meaning (discourse) and what lies beyond it (enjoyment/jouissance). Thus ideology critique, in addition to 'bringing about the ''deconstruction'' of the spontaneous experience of [. . .] meaning', must aim 'at extracting the kernel of enjoyment, at articulating the way in which -beyond the field of meaning but at the same time internal to it -an ideology implies, manipulates, produces a pre-ideological enjoyment structured in fantasy'. 109 The Lacanian technique required to effect this is to 'traverse the fantasy': 'all we have to do is experience how there is nothing ''behind'' it'. 110 In other words, since fantasy is generated as a kind of defence mechanism against the apparently totalizing power of the big Other, what we have to do is see that the Other too is incomplete, not omnipotent. And this is 'correlative to identification with a sinthome', 111 some unspeakable, obscene signifier where jouissance makes itself felt in the symbolic order.
If this seems too abstract a dose of Lacanian medicine, let us look (again in a spirit of conjecture) to a couple of concrete examples of how newly occurring popular music genres have performed just such an ideology critique through their own praxis (which again points to the restless oscillation between jouissance and fantasy as a driver of history). Most obviously there was punk rock, with its puncturing of the fantasmatic world of progressive rock, its 'extract[ion of] the kernel of enjoyment' from the latter, its de-gentrification of the latter's fantasy world, its reinstallation of jouissance. The gobbing of fans on performers, and the other metonymic markers of body fluids, excrescences, and waste -tampons, safety pins, and bin liners: these would be examples of the sinthome, something in the same league as 'a terrifying bodily mark which is merely a mute attestation bearing witness to a disgusting enjoyment without representing anything or anyone'. 112 And couldn't the same symptomatic lack of rationale also mark the vocal and instrumental delivery of the performers, and the nihilism and putative anti-sophistication of their songs -the whole refusal to pay the big Other its due on a compositional level? Then there would be the more extreme forms of hip-hop -sub-genres that represent a radical break from other more 'gentrified' popular forms. Certainly, the imagery of these genres has invested heavily in fantasy -opulent displays of fashion and wealth that apparently only endorse the high capitalist system that the performers might be thought to be (or ought to be) criticizing. But, along with the violence, misogyny, and homophobia also often associated with them, could it be that the very obscenity of these displays (not unlike punk's use of the swastika) invites us to understand them on a level -that of the sinthome -which, however problematically, gives them a critical force beyond their objectionable appearance?
Not Quite a Conclusion
Empiricists are likely to be reluctant to buy into the allegorical Lacanian language game that underpins the Ž ižekian ideas I have begun to deploy above. Having recidivist empiricist tendencies myself, I'm also tempted to interpose a moment of agnosticism -for example: is fantasy really 'a scenario filling out the empty space of a fundamental impossibility [. . .] in the last resort, always a fantasy of the sexual relationship'?; 113 might there not be other equally fruitful ways to construe it?; does Lacanianism itself not risk becoming another kind of doxa? Moreover, there is possibly something worryingly masculinist about the Ž ižekian project: the fixation on antagonism being only a step away from combativeness; the sheer volume of his oeuvre exerting the pressure of a monument akin to that of the big Other itself (should one rise to the oedipal challenge? or simply traverse the fantasy? or does this use of Ž ižek's own post-Freudian terms of reference -not to mention the parenthetically overdetermined sentence structure -signal that he has nonetheless been persuasive?). Given that feminism is a key part of postmodernism's discursive constellation, this puts critics of postmodernism (whether they draw on Ž ižek or not) in an uneasy position -and there is space here only to signal this as an issue needing careful negotiation and further consideration in the future.
Notwithstanding these reservations, what this Ž ižekian foray has indicated is that it may be possible to reinstate the critique of ideology, and to formulate a model for how musical utterances both respond to and resist the call of ideology, in a way that does not a priori privilege one type of music over another. This developing model would seem, then, to offer a small but crucial modification to Adorno's conceit of 'torn halves' ('both [musical spheres] bear the stigmata of capitalism, both contain elements of change') -which it also resembles in the refusal to construe the social antagonism to which these different musics point as tending towards resolution ('both are torn halves of an integral freedom, to which, however, they do not add up'). 114 The connection with Adorno's negative dialectics is important. For the nub of Ž ižek's approach is to have facilitated a dialecticized dialogics -an attractive proposition for the present project, since it takes Bakhtin's recognition that the discursive world involves a dialogical engagement between many modalities of language, and combines it with the idea that these incommensurable discursive formations might somehow be implicated in a dialectical movement of history through a process of critical negation. To elaborate on this a little (and to partly summarize the trajectory of this essay), we may posit three salient levels correlative to the 'Elvis-and-Darmstadt realization' -three increasingly radical ways of registering the significance of the musical other -culminating with the dialecticized-dialogical moment.
First, while the realization of a plural cultural universe may force a certain recognition or acceptance of the other, we may nonetheless continue on our paths indifferent to one another, or simply take a culinary attitude to each other's music. These would be versions of weak relativism (which have been associated here with certain brands of liberalism and postmodernism). Either they leave the subject intact at the centre of its own imaginary empire, untouched by what surrounds it; or they avail it of a wider range of consumer choices which it can contemplate from the still ideologically untroubled standpoint of its own imaginary completeness as subject.
Secondly, weak relativism embarks on an inevitable tendency towards strong relativism as soon as subjects engage in discourse about their different musics, especially if this involves (implicitly or explicitly) some notion of legitimation. This would signal a potentially emancipatory level of the Elvis-and-Darmstadt realization, provided enunciation is also accompanied by listening: by dint of occupying a different place in the signifying order, you may be more readily able to convey to me what is ideological in my account of my musical practice; and, mutatis mutandis, I can do the same for you. This echoes a thought in one of Bakhtin's earliest essays, Towards a Philosophy of the Act; 115 but it is more substantially reflected in his later dialogical theories under the concept of social heteroglossia. In this environment 'specific world views each characterized by its own objects, meanings and values [. . .] another, contradict one another and be interrelated dialogically'. 116 It was Bakhtin's profound observation that our utterances are heteroglot; and given that the voicing of utterances is crucial to constituting ourselves as subjects, this would reinforce the point that (at this historical juncture at least) we are all plural; let us recognize the mongrel self! There is something potentially tremendously humanizing in this strong-relativist conception (which is what makes strong relativism a desirable paradigm). It offers a corrective to what we might term the 'terror of values'. Value, a leitmotif of this essay, is in one sense essential to all our practices if we are not to collapse into nihilism or cynicism. At the same time, essential to a value is its impulse towards universality: by definition it could not be a value if it only pertained to one's self. This point is analogous to one perspicaciously made by Rose Rosengard Subotnik about 'any genuinely individualized vision of reality', which, she says, 'sustains the force it needs to actualize itself by taking on something like the status of Kant's categorical imperative. Though its conviction of its own validity is subjective, it imputes to itself a quality of necessity that entails the possibility of general affirmation '. 117 It is only by encountering the expanding horizons of other values that the expanding horizons of our own (and theirs) can be -at least in principle -checked in their universalizing, and hence imperializing, tendencies.
Thirdly, Bakhtin's own description of this as an 'agitated and tension-filled environment', 118 suggests something cognate with Ž ižek's notion of social antagonism. However, it is the latter's further insights that enable this strong-relativist dialogical situation to be dialecticized. To experience the Elvis-and-Darmstadt realization dialectically involves 'tarrying with the negative' (to use a phrase that Ž ižek borrows from Hegel). If, as part of our dialogical interaction, you from your discursive space -say, as a popular music exponentare able to discern the rustle of ideology in my pro-avant-gardist discourse, and I enact a corresponding critique of your popular music practice, our respective negations of each others' discourse may well not resolve into a set of complementary arguments, nor 'sublate' into some higher synthesis of our contradictory opinions: we may each remain on our original ground. Yet even so, we may still in some way also have moved beyond it. In negating each others' negation, it is possible that we may each come out of this encounter with our views changed, however subtly -which might amount to a kind of movement in the history of our positions that could legitimately be termed a progression (dare one say, an 'improvement') beyond the previous state of things, negotiated around our antagonism. This can be linked to a point made by Ž ižek: this double, self-referential negation does not entail any kind of return to positive identity, any kind of abolition, of cancellation of the disruptive force of negativity, of reducing it to a passing moment in the self-mediating process of identity; in the 'negation of the negation', the negativity preserves all its disruptive power; the whole point is just that we come to experience how this negative, disruptive power, menacing our identity is simultaneously a positive condition of it. The 'negation of the negation' does not in any way abolish the antagonism, it consists only in the experience of the fact that this immanent limit which is preventing me from achieving my full identity with myself simultaneously enables me to achieve a minimum of positive consistency, however mutilated it is. 119 Experienced dialectically, then, the Elvis-and-Darmstadt realization involves just this recognition of an 'immanent limit which is preventing me from achieving my full identity with myself '. It involves registering that my place in the signifying order could have been other; that, therefore, the signifying order itself (and its universe of meaning and values) could have been other; that, therefore, the signifying order is not complete or absolute, and neither -since my sense of self relies on it -am I. Thus the encounter with the other (with what I am not) leads on not to a higher synthesis that makes me whole, but to a more 'truthful' awareness of a 'hole', a gap, in myself and in the symbolic order of things. Yet this negativity is not negative in a pejorative sense. A gap is, after all, an opening, and even if this is defined by an absence of content (for in the Lacanian scheme it is a void), it can still serve to unshackle me from a dogmatic attachment to my values; to allow me scope to move into new spaces. Projected on to a larger social canvas, such a thought is suggestive indeed.
It was probably always evident that the Elvis-and-Darmstadt 'question' was/is never going to be resolved. But what matters most is registering it on the right level. My initial intuition that the Elvis-and-Darmstadt realization feels more like an answer looking for a question would seem to find a resonance in the following from Ž ižek:
If, then, antagonism is always a kind of opening, a hole in the field of the symbolic Other, a void of an unanswered, unresolved question, the 'negation of the negation' does not bring us the final answer filling out the void of all questions: it is to be conceived more like a paradoxical twist whereby the question itself begins to function as its own answer; what we mistook for a question was already an answer. [. . .] More than this, in the post-Marxist formulations of Laclau and Mouffe, antagonism is the defining element of radical democracy. This idea is most readily encapsulated in the following statement from Mouffe's book The Democratic Paradox: 'One of the keys to the thesis of agonistic pluralism is that, far from jeopardizing democracy, agonistic confrontation is in fact its very condition of existence. Modern democracy's specificity lies in the recognition and legitimation of conflict and the refusal to suppress it by imposing an authoritarian order.' 121 This view of democracy arises from the recognition that since 'society does not exist' -that is, society cannot be unrepressively represented as a totality by any single group -we have to relinquish 'the ideal of a democratic society as the realization of a perfect harmony or transparency'. 122 But there is clearly a difference between a conflicted society (which we already seem amply to have) and this vision of a more productive, democratic antagonism. The crucial move would seem to require the dropping of a syllable: moving (as indicated in Mouffe's words above) from antagonism to agonism -from enmity to productive adversariality. But how to effect this in reality? I would argue that, whatever else (and there may, of course, be much else), this requires individual subjects, or groups sharing an identification, to respond to what is in effect an ethical imperative (that perhaps encapsulates the dynamics of strong relativism): Internalize your antagonism! In other words, undertake the double negation -as epitomized in the dialecticized Elvis-and-Darmstadt realizationthat enables you to hold to your own position while registering its own negation by the position of the other; that enables you to experience the position of the other in its dissonance with your own; that enables you (and the other) to register the void that is the mark of no final resting place to the dialogue; but that also enables some kind of progress, since we are each registering in and for ourselves the authentic discomfort of the gap in and between our selves. Paradoxically, the common ground between us may be a shared realization of a certain absence of common ground -the Real of (ant)agonism.
Together, these three levels begin to look like a dialectical schema, and though I don't intend this programmatically, I nurture a hope that this may serve as compass with which to navigate musical pluralism and its related complex of ideas. That it might be relevant at musical, cultural, social, and political levels is a thought-provoking prospect; in other words, what we learn through working these issues through in our musical practices and discourses may be permeable to larger and urgent political debates. But it is perhaps in terms of our everyday musical practices, and especially musical pedagogy -which is where we came inthat we might most usefully look for a practical application.
I would hazard that many educational institutions are now reaching the first of these levels: where otherness is recognized as a cultural reality, and may in some way be represented in their curricula. In other words, they have moved from monism (typically, a curriculum dominated by classical music) to a liberalist weak relativism. But one mandate -socially as well as educationally -would be to move to the next two levels. Creatively, numerous practitioners now seem to be working on the second, that of dialogism (and some have been doing so for a long time). These might include composer-performers such as Jan Garbarek, John Harle, and Tim Garland, moving fluidly between jazz and tonal-contemporary idioms; postminimalist groups such as Icebreaker and the Michael Gordon band; and a number of our own students, for whom musical boundaries seem either not to exist or are readily permeable. 123 These encounters may already involve forms of dialogue -even creative frictions -between musicians of different cultural backgrounds, based on some form of commonality, some real, socially constructed shared space, as envisioned by the likes of Mohanty. This begs the question of what more one might want (except for yet more of it); of whether there is any need for a more radically dialecticized version -a third level. For postmodernists (and any liberals left over from the previous stage), this is probably where the historical bus stops: the very kind of place we need to be. And it's hard totally to dissent: the music's so pleasurable, and it comports a social vision that if realized would promise a happy reality. But of course that vision has not been realized; and a counterargument might run that it's too soon to be 'revelling in the rubble', 124 that antagonism has not yet been transformed into agonism, and that in order to do so we need to explore our antagonisms more deeply. (This may be particularly the case with those students showing a fluid attitude to musical genres; their problem is perhaps the reverse of that of their ageing lecturers, and they might be galvanized by a more intense sense of historical and cultural difference.) Paradoxically, then, the second level may be where we want to end up, but this, arguably, gains greater authenticity for being achieved via the third. While the empirical reality will undoubtedly be much messier (and we should probably resist the temptation to tidy it up), we might nevertheless speculate on the idea of a four-stage dialectic -where stage two is, as it were, experienced twice, the second time as a developed recapitulation following stage three. Unlike our present historical conjuncture, this future moment might resemble Adorno's truly beautiful description (which, to avoid turning it into a slogan, I won't quote here) of what -'if speculation on the state of reconciliation were permitted' -would constitute peace among human beings. 125 
